Before Consciousness
Plain of Lesithi, island of Crete, 1980 |
Julian Jaynes earned
master's and doctoral degrees in Psychology from Yale, and taught at Princeton
from 1966 to 1990, the whole time doing science. One online bibliography of his
work lists over 40 articles in peer-reviewed scientific journals, book chapters,
and presentations. He accomplished a lot in his field.
The journal articles
include “Imprinting. The interaction of learned and innate behavior: III.
Practice effects on performance, retention and fear” in the Journal of Comparative and Physiological
Psychology, “The function of the frontal cortex” in Psychological review, “Studies of Maternal Retrieving in Rats. III.
Sensory Cues Involved in the Lactating Female’s Response To Her Young” in Behaviour, and “The evolution of language
in the late Pleistocene” in the Annals of
the New York Academy of Sciences.
Hard
science, peer reviewed, from a Princeton researcher.
Jaynes
wrote only one book. He titled it The
Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind.
Being
a scientist with a sharp mind and curiosity to boot, the first few chapters of
that book he devotes to defining terms and creating context. He lists the
various broad answers science has proposed to the question, “What is the origin
of consciousness in evolution?”, and discusses the difficulties and
shortcomings of each.
He
then looks closely at a list of broad answers to the question, “What is
consciousness?” This chapter, “The Consciousness of Consciousness,” is probably
the best exposition that I’ve ever read of the different answers to that
question, and the assessment of each: Is it probable? Is there evidence? What
does relevant research say?
He
then lays out his conclusions:
Consciousness is not
mere reactivity to the environment.
It’s not involved in
most visual phenomena.
It’s not “involved in
the performance of skills and often hinders their execution”.
It’s not necessary for
speaking, writing, listening, or reading.
It doesn’t “copy down experience”
like a camera or videorecorder.
It’s not involved at all
in classical conditioning of behavior.
It’s not necessary for
learning skills or solutions.
It’s not necessary for
making judgments.
It’s not the source of
reasoning.
It has no location.
He
ends this very long, very well presented argument:
If our reasonings have been correct, it is
perfectly possible that there could have existed a race of [humans] who spoke,
judged, reasoned, solved problems, indeed did most of the things that we do,
but who were not conscious at all…
[U]nless you are here convinced that a civilization
without consciousness is possible, you will find the discussion that follows unconvincing
and paradoxical.
But rather than take my word for it, if you've read this far: get your hands on this book, and read chapters 1, 2 and 3, preferably in one sitting.
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