The Philosopher's Cul de Sac

"In the Cartesian, Hobbesian, and Lockean traditions, which dominate our culture, we are told that when we are conscious, we are primarily aware of ourselves or our own ideas. Consciousness is taken to be like a bubble or an enclosed cabinet; the mind comes in a box. Impressions and concepts occur in this enclosed space, in this circle of ideas and experiences, and our awareness is directed toward them, not directly toward the things “outside.” We can try to get outside by making inferences: we may reason that our ideas must have been caused by something outside us, and we may construct hypotheses or models of what those things must be like, but we are not in any direct contact with them. We get to things only by reasoning from our mental impressions, not by having them presented to us."

Robert Solokowski, Introduction to Phenomenology

Solokowski's statement appears patently false, that 'the Cartesian, Hobbesian, and Lockean traditions...dominate our culture." I know not one person who in any way has indicated to me that they are 'making inferences' or 'constructing hypotheses or models' of what the Real Hamburger is that has induced these 'mental impressions' in them. This is strictly a preoccupation of academic philosophers.

I think this is a fair reading of Solokowski, as he later states that the "Cartesian predicament...is the unfortunate situation in which philosophy finds itself in our time." Philosophy, as an academic tradition. So, it is within that tradition that the phenomenological concept of 'intentionality' constitutes an answer to the 'problem' of being locked up inside the theater in our heads - us academic philosophers, that is. This is academic, or abstract, intentionality.

At the same time, Solokowski describes what I see also, but from a slightly different angle: people feel locked out, left out of something good, something big, and they are trying to get to it however they can. These people feel locked out, not in. They do feel in touch with the world, the world of the senses, but they ache for so much more. These people aren't philosophers, but they are making inferences and building and testing hypotheses as to how best, and most quickly, to reach their goal.

At this point matters look surprising: the philosophers, despairing of getting outside their heads, have come up with a way to touch the 'real': intentionality. This intentionality, though, is not concrete - only abstract - and so doesn't make any difference.

On the other hand, the non-philosophers, wholly in touch with and smothered by the 'real', are constructing hypotheses left and right, doing their damnedest to punch themselves out of the real and into the beautiful and joyous and free. This intentionality is only practical, and not successful in a sustaining, abiding way.

Can we find some way through these two experiments to a real method, an objective, self-sustaining and self-justifying experience of beauty and joy and freedom?